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This memorandum explores the various ways the Second Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate
panel (“B.A.P.”), district courts, and bankruptcy courts5 consider applications for stays pending
appeal. Part I discusses two tests, the “judicial discretion” and the “preliminary injunction” test,
that the courts in the Second Circuit may use, and then how each factor of the preliminary
injunction test is analyzed. Part II discusses the two approaches courts in the Second Circuit
adopt under the preliminary injunction test (whether or not all four factors must be satisfied) and
how the courts weigh each of the four factors, regardless of the approach taken.
I.

Comparing the Judicial Discretion Test to the Preliminary Injunction Test
A. The Judicial Discretion Test may be Applied to Non-Injunctive Stays
The judicial discretion test may be used when requested relief is related to “regulating the

process of and procedure,” of the case, as opposed to relief akin to preliminary injunctions.6 For
example, in the 1981 case, Neisner, the appellant sought a stay from an order issued by the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which denied his objections to certain
claims, thereby causing disbursements to be made on those claims.7 In considering the stay, the
same court labeled the request for relief as “non-injunctive” and applied the more lenient
standard of judicial discretion.8 When applying this standard, courts are only required to use their

5

A motion for a stay, “may be made in the court where the appeal is pending.” FED. R. BANKR. P.
8007(b)(1). “The motion for relief in the district court, BAP, or court of appeals must state why it was
impracticable to seek relief initially in the bankruptcy court, if a motion was not filed there, or why the
bankruptcy court denied the relief sought.” Id. advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments. If the
motion is made in the district court, it “functions as an appellate court in reviewing judgments rendered
by bankruptcy courts.” In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 346.
6
11 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1; see In re Neisner, 10 B.R. at 300
(applying the judicial discretion test in consideration of the appellant’s request for “non-injunctive”
relief). But see In re Smith, 34 B.R. at 146 (applying the judicial discretion test even though the nature of
the stay was injunctive).
7
See 10 B.R. at 300.
8
Id. (“Such non-injunctive related relief does not require that any stricter standards be applied to an
application for a stay pending appeal other than that of judicial discretion exercised to protect the rights of
all parties in interest.”).
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sound judicial discretion and to “protect the rights of all parties in interest.”9 However, courts
may instead opt for the preliminary injunction test, regardless of the non-injunctive nature of the
stay.10 Indeed, courts in the Second Circuit appear to have exclusively used the preliminary
injunction test regardless of the nature of the stay, following the Second Circuit’s 1993 decision
in Hirschfeld v. Bd. of Elections in New York, 984 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1993).11
B. Courts Adopting the Preliminary Injunction Test Analyze Four Factors
In Hirschfeld, the Second Circuit enumerated four factors to be considered in motions for
stays pending appeal:
(1) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay,
(2) whether a party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued,
(3) whether the movant has demonstrated “ ‘a substantial possibility, although less
than a likelihood, of success’ ” on appeal, and
(4) the public interests that may be affected.12
These prongs are the same four factors considered for a preliminary injunction.13

9

Id. (granting the stay even though “the retention of the funds by the disbursing agent present[ed] no
threat to the claimants, but a disbursement . . . might, albeit improbably, cause harm to the debtor”).
10
See In re Friedberg, No. 91 CIV. 7490 (JFK), 1991 WL 259038, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1991)
(considering the four factors of the preliminary injunction test for a stay pending appeal of an order
appointing a trustee).
11
See, e.g., In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 375 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 4, 1997) (adopting
the test enumerated in Hirschfeld); In re Brown, No. 18-10617 (JLG), 2020 WL 3264057, at *5 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020) (same); In re Sphere Holding Corp., 162 B.R. 639, 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
12
Hirschfeld v. Bd. of Elections in New York, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Dubose v.
Pierce, 761 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1985)). Although the standard enumerated in Hirschfeld was applied in
the context of a non-bankruptcy procedure and under Rule 8A of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the relevant bankruptcy rule—8007—was adapted from Rule 8A. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007
advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments (“This rule is derived from former Rule 8005
and F.R.App.P. 8.”); Hirschfeld, 984 F.2d 35. Therefore, this standard has been adopted for stays pending
appeal of bankruptcy matters. See, e.g., In re Turner, 207 B.R. at 375.
13
See In re Sphere Holding, 162 B.R. at 642 (“In order to obtain a stay from a Bankruptcy Court order the
appellant must make the same showing normally required for a preliminary injunction or stays of other
kinds of orders.” (quoting In re Hi–Toc Development Corp., 159 B.R. 691, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1993)).
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

i. Irreparable Harm: Sometimes Equitable Mootness is Enough to
Satisfy This Prong
A showing that the movant will suffer irreparable injury without the stay is the “principal
prerequisite for the issuance of a stay pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8007, and such harm must be
neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.”14 Irreparable harm may be considered
in the context of financial harm to the movant. For example, courts have considered creditors
collecting monies owed from the movant or foreclosure of a movant’s property to constitute
irreparable harm to the movant.15
Mootness may also constitute harm. However, courts are split as to whether the
irreparable injury prong may be satisfied by a showing that the appeal would be moot absent a
stay.16 The majority of federal courts find that mootness, standing alone, is not enough.17 Several
courts in the Second Circuit have diverged from the majority view, recognizing that the loss of

14

In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted); see In re Sabine Oil & Gas
Corp., 548 B.R. 674, 681–82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding the hypothetical and remote harm of a
potential order confirming the debtors' proposed plan of reorganization too remote to satisfy this prong);
see also In re Turner, 207 B.R. at 376 (finding although appellants would be evicted from their home
absent a stay, they did not intend to stay in the home when they filed chapter 7 and, therefore, would not
be harmed).
15
See Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding completion of foreclosure
proceedings could cause considerable harm to the debtors); In re Sphere Holding, 162 B.R. at 644
(concluding the debtor would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay because its major creditors would
move to collect the debt); cf. In re Turner, 207 B.R. at 376 (concluding that, although appellants will be
evicted from their home absent a stay, this did not constitute harm because they intended to sell their
home).
16
See In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Courts are divided, and the
Second Circuit has not yet spoken, on the issue of whether the risk that an appeal may become moot in
the absence of a stay pending appeal satisfies the irreparable injury requirement.”).
17
Id. at 347 (“A majority of courts have held that a risk of mootness, standing alone, does not constitute
irreparable harm.”).
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the right to appeal is a “quintessential form of prejudice.”18 Still, some courts find that a showing
of mootness is enough to prove only some irreparable injury.19
In considering what situations would render an appeal moot, courts must consider the
relief requested in the context of the type of bankruptcy case filed. For example, if the movant
requests a stay of an order confirming a chapter 11 reorganization plan, courts in the Second
Circuit have recognized that “substantial consummation” of that plan while the case is pending
appeal, would render the appeal moot.20 Alternatively, where a movant asks for stay of an order
expunging a claim in a chapter 7 liquidation case, courts have recognized full administration of
the estate requires several steps and harm is unlikely if the Trustee is still searching for assets.21
Furthermore, in chapter 13 cases involving foreclosure, courts “have gone to unusual lengths to
provide the debtor with an opportunity to be heard on these motions,” because of the danger in
rendering an appeal moot.22

18

Id. (quoting In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2nd Cir. BAP 1996))
(concluding the irreparable injury prong was satisfied because there was “a very strong likelihood that
any appeal would be moot” without the stay); see Daly v. Germain (In re Norwich Historic Pres. Tr.,
LLC), No. 3:05CV12(MRK), 2005 WL 977067, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2005) (assuming appellant “has
satisfied the irreparable harm prong of the four-part test because of the concern that the lack of a stay will
moot his appeal”). But see In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 681 (noting that the majority of courts find risk of
mootness insufficient, but declining to decide on this issue).
19
See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
20
See In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 347; see also In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 681 (finding mootness was
not proven because Committee will have a full opportunity to voice objections to proposed reorganization
plan before its confirmation).
21
In re Brown, No. 18-10617 (JLG), 2020 WL 3264057, at *6–7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020)
(concluding movant failed to show irreparable harm because it was unlikely the Trustee would find and
fully distribute her claimed assets to creditors before the appeal’s resolution).
22
Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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ii. Injury to the Movant in the Absence of a Stay Must Outweigh Injury to
Non-Movants if the Stay is Granted
To overcome any potential harm to non-movants if the stay is granted, the movant must
show “the balance of harms tips in favor of granting the stay.”23 To assess the “balance of
harms,” courts compare the potential harm that would be suffered by non-movants if the stay is
granted to the potential harm that would be suffered by the movant if the stay is denied.24
Therefore, if the movant failed to show irreparable harm in the first prong, the balance of harms
automatically does not weigh in his or her favor.25
There are several avenues courts explore in considering the balance of harms against nonmoving parties. The weight attributed to parties’ potential harm may be considered in light of
how parties might have mitigated harm to themselves.26 Courts also recognize harm to the nonmoving party may be financial or something more intangible, and such harm may be imparted to
more than just creditors.27 For example, in General Motors, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York noted that a grant of the stay would drag out the bankruptcy case
and force G.M. to liquidate, therefore causing “the loss of consumer confidence” and “the death
of a company.”28

23

In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *7 (quoting In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 349).
See id.; Green Point Bank, 188 B.R. at 12 (finding the movant’s injury was not irreparable and was
counterbalanced by the secured creditor’s potential injury if the foreclosure sale was to be stayed).
25
See, In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 376 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 4, 1997) (finding the
appellant would not suffer any harm absent the stay, and thus, the harm suffered by the purchasers of the
property would be greater); In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *7 (finding that, despite appellant’s
argument that creditors would gain at her expense, she failed to demonstrate any risk of harm to herself
and, therefore, this factor could not weigh in her favor).
26
See In re Tower Auto., Inc., No. 05-10578 ALG, 2006 WL 2583624, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 28,
2006) (discussing that, “[i]n analyzing the balance of the harms, the [appellant] Committee's own action
and inaction is telling” because it delayed seeking a stay until the eve of settlement consummation); see
also In re Adelphia 361 B.R. at 354 (finding the potential financial harm to non-movants didn’t weigh
against the stay because a bond could protect them).
27
See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding irreparable injury to
G.M.’s creditors, employees, retirees, dealers and suppliers).
28
Id. at 32–33.
24
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Furthermore, harm to non-moving parties should be considered in the context of the
chapter of the bankruptcy case. For example, this factor is particularly difficult to satisfy in
chapter 11 and chapter 13 reorganization cases “because courts are reluctant to stay the
enforcement of an order pending its appeal if this delay could thwart efforts to confirm a plan.”29
Harms to non-moving and third parties, resulting from the postponement of chapter 11
reorganization proceedings, include: “(i) lost strategic opportunities; (ii) difficulty in recruiting
and retaining talent for the Debtor; (iii) incurrence of administrative and professional expenses;
(iv) placing plan settlements in jeopardy; and (v) exposing the equity to be granted to nonmoving creditors to market volatility and other risks.”30
iii. To Show Substantial Possibility of Success on Appeal, Movants Need
Only Show Plausibility and Should not Rely on Previous Arguments
Made to the Bankruptcy Court
In analyzing the third factor in the preliminary injunction test, the Second Circuit requires
that the movant show “substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success on
appeal.”31 Substantial possibility may be defined as somewhere in between “possible and
probable,” landing in the realm of plausibility.32

29

8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at § 170:81; see In re Sabine Oil & Gas
Corp., 548 B.R. 674, 683 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that certain harms may befall the debtorappellee if their chapter 11 case is stayed); In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 342 (recognizing “[t]he inability to
consummate the Plan resulting from a stay of that order could cause the estates to incur more than a
billion dollars in additional costs or could even cause the Plan to collapse”); Green Point Bank, 188 B.R.
at 12 (finding the non-movant would be harmed from “continued delay” of a sale in a chapter 13 case).
30
In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 683.
31
Hirschfeld v. Bd. of Elections in New York, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Dubose v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1985)).
32
In re Brown, No. 18-10617 (JLG), 2020 WL 3264057, at *7–8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 683–84) (finding it was not
plausible that the debtor’s ex-wife, claiming her share of marital assets in a chapter 7 bankruptcy action,
could demonstrate on appeal that she relied on the debtor’s fraudulent disclosures in settling her divorce).
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The intermediate “substantial possibility” standard illustrates the Second Circuit’s desire
to protect credible claims but eliminate frivolous ones.33 Some courts in the Second Circuit have
adopted a more relaxed standard requiring only that a “substantial case on the merits” be
presented when there’s a serious legal question and equity favors granting the stay.34
Despite the Second Circuit’s more relaxed approach, this factor is particularly difficult to
satisfy because an argument often must be made in the first instance, to the bankruptcy court that
has already ruled against the applicant.35 Moreover, even appellants who submitted the motion
for a stay in a different court, such as the district court, will be unsuccessful in satisfying this
prong if they continue to rely on their previously unsuccessful arguments.36
Another consideration in analyzing success on appeal concerns the standard of review on
appeal. The court ruling on the stay might consider the standard the appellate court will use when
reviewing the claims, such as: abuse of discretion, clear error, or de novo review.37 For example,

33

In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 376–79 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 4, 1997) (finding the
chapter 13 case, which was filed while movant’s chapter 7 case was still open, was “likely null and void
from its inception” and unlikely to succeed on appeal).
34
In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 349 (quoting LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 72–73 (2d Cir.1994)) (“[T]he
movant need not always show a ‘probability of success' on the merits . . . .”).
35
See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 26, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (reviewing its previous
decision when considering a stay pending appeal of that decision); 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 1, at § 170:79 (“[T]his showing is always a difficult one, because it is to be made
in the first instance to the court who has by definition ruled against the applicant.”).
36
See In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *8–9 (relying on the trial court’s rationale for denying
appellants claim); In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 683–84 (finding appellants failed this prong because they
failed to cite new case law in support of arguments previously presented to and rejected by the same court
in which they are now moving for the stay); Daly v. Germain (In re Norwich Historic Pres. Tr., LLC),
No. 3:05CV12(MRK), 2005 WL 977067, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2005) (concluding the movant failed to
show substantial possibility of prevailing on appeal where he “merely repeat[ed] his assertion, previously
pressed in the Bankruptcy Court”).
37
See In re Metiom, Inc., 318 B.R. 263, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he Court finds that there is no
substantial possibility that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Rule
2004 examination, and hence that there is no substantial possibility that ePlus's appeal will succeed.”
(emphasis added)); In re Sphere Holding Corp., 162 B.R. 639, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating “in order for
debtor to succeed on the merits, it will have to demonstrate on appeal that Judge Holland abused his
discretion in dismissing its Chapter 11 case”). This consideration of the standard of review on appeal
should not be confused with a district court’s overall obligation to review a bankruptcy court’s finding of
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in Sphere Holding, the Eastern District Court of New York concluded that the debtor seeking
injunctive relief from his creditors would likely prevail on the merits of his appeal because he
could show the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in dismissing his chapter 11 case after
only three months, which was not an unreasonable delay in the context of that case.38
iv. The Public Interest Favors Expedient Litigation Over the Possibility of
Mootness on Appeal
A stay must not be inconsistent with the public’s interest.39 Reminiscent of the equitable
mootness doctrine considered in the “irreparable harm” prong, courts have also noted “there is
undoubtedly a public interest in giving litigants the ability to appeal.”40 Equitable mootness is
particularly salient where parties object to a distribution plan, because distribution of the
settlement award would deprive appellants of right to review that plan.41 Courts have also
recognized that the public interest does not favor a stay when the appellants have failed to show
their appeal would be moot absent a stay.42

fact for clear error and reviewing the bankruptcy court’s conclusion of law de novo when considering a
stay pending appeal. See In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 346.
38
162 B.R. at 643–44.
39
See e.g., id. at 642 (“Therefore, in order for debtor to receive the injunctive relief requested, he must
satisfy this court that . . . the granting of the relief sought is not contrary to public policy.” (first citing
In re Hi–Toc Development Corp., 159 B.R. 691, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1993); then citing In re Cretella, 47 B.R.
382, 383–84 (E.D.N.Y.1984))); 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at § 170:82
(“A stay will not be granted if an injunction of enforcement of the order on appeal would be inconsistent
with the public interest.”).
40
In re Gen. Motors, 409 B.R. at 32.
41
See In re Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 349–50 (recognizing the possibility of mootness when ruling on a stay
of a confirmation order in a chapter 11 reorganization case).
42
In re Brown, No. 18-10617 (JLG), 2020 WL 3264057, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020) (finding
the public interest would not be harmed because the appellant “failed to demonstrate that there is any
likelihood that her appeal will be mooted if the stay is not granted”); In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 548
B.R. 674, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding appellant failed to show public interest favors the stay in
part because “[appellant] has not established the existence of any current threat of equitable mootness”).
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Moreover, what courts consider “the public” in “public interest” reaches far beyond just
creditors.43 For example, in General Motors the court recognized the sweeping potential harm of
a stay on a sales order, which would in effect cause G.M. to liquidate, and therefore harm the
entire North American auto industry, increase future resulting bankruptcies filed by G.M.’s
suppliers, and cause hardship to G.M. employees losing healthcare.44
Public interest also favors expedient litigation, finality in litigation, and successful
reorganization.45 Therefore, courts will reject a stay where the appellant has repeatedly failed to
meet his or her obligations under bankruptcy law.46 Even where the court concedes there is a
public interest in preserving claims for appeal, this concern may be outweighed by the need for
expedient administration, particularly where success on appeal is unlikely.47
II.

Courts Disagree on Whether all Four Factors of the Preliminary Injunction Test
must be Established, but Agree Each Factor may be Weighed Differently

Courts differ as to whether each factor of the preliminary injunction test must be established
to grant a stay, or whether factors may be balanced against each other so that inability to prove

43

See In re Gen. Motors, 409 B.R. at 33 (considering the injury to employees, retirees, dealers, and
suppliers if the company were to liquidate as a result of a stay).
44
Id.
45
See e.g., In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *10 (“The public interest favors compliance with court
orders and timely resolution of litigation.”); In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 368 (considering whether “the
potential benefits of the litigation outweigh the costs, monetary and otherwise, to the Debtors'
reorganization”).
46
See In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 379 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 4, 1997) (finding a stay
was not in the public’s interest because appellants failed to take action against the foreclosure sale, failed
to file a chapter 7 petition, and tried to seek bankruptcy protection twice to delay the foreclosure sale);
Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding it was in the public interest to
deny the request because the debtor had attempted to indefinitely delay the foreclosure of his property).
47
See In re Metiom, Inc., 318 B.R. 263, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding expedient administration more
important in a case where the non-party appellant was unlikely to succeed on appeal); see also In re
Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *10 (rejecting the argument that “the public interest in ‘expedient
administration of bankruptcy proceedings’ is outweighed by the right of parties to appellate review”).
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one is not dispositive to the appellant’s motion.48 Courts in the Second Circuit are split as to
which approach to take.49 Regardless of the approach taken, the burden on the party seeking
relief is heavy.50 Stays pending appeal are granted in limited circumstances only.51 Courts
adopting either view have noted “satisfactory evidence on all four criteria” should be shown.52
A. Courts in the Second Circuit Follow both the Majority and Minority Approaches
The majority of federal courts require the movant satisfy all four factors of the
preliminary injunction test.53 Courts in the Second Circuit adopting this view, state that “[f]ailure
to satisfy one prong of this standard for granting a stay will doom the motion.”54 This is such a
divisive issue that some courts have declined to address which view they would adopt when the
stay should be denied under either approach.55

48

Kenneth S. Leonetti & Euripides Dalmanieras, Procedural Issues In Bankruptcy Appeals, 5 Bankr.
Litig. Comm., ABI Comm. News 219, 230 (2008),
https://foleyhoag.com/people/attorneys/~/media/21BF7BC131CB48ABA17E4542B70C3D82.ashx.
49
See In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *5 (recognizing both tests have been used in courts in the
Second Circuit); In re Albicocco, No. 06-CV-3409 (JFB), 2006 WL 2620464 at *1, n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2006) (recognizing conflicting case law in courts in the Second Circuit on the appropriate standard).
50
See e.g., In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *5.
51
Id.
52
In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 375 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 4, 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting In re Bijan–Sara Corp., 203 B.R. 358, 360 (2d Cir. B.A.P. 1996)) (adopting the
rule that the movant must satisfy all four criteria); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 33 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (adopting the balancing approach).
53
Leonetti & Dalmanieras, supra note 48, at 230.
54
In re Turner, 207 B.R. at 375 (citing In re Bijan–Sara, 203 B.R. at 360); see In re Tower Auto., Inc.,
No. 05-10578 ALG, 2006 WL 2583624, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2006) (adopting the rule that all
four prongs must be satisfied); Daly v. Germain (In re Norwich Historic Pres. Tr., LLC), No.
3:05CV12(MRK), 2005 WL 977067, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2005) (same); In re Metiom, Inc., 318 B.R.
263, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same); Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same).
55
See In re Brown, 2020 WL 3264057, at *5 (“The Court declines to determine whether Jennifer is
required to satisfy all four factors of the four-part test in order to succeed on her Stay Motion. . . . Debtor's
Stay Motion must be denied—under both tests.”); In re Albicocco, No. 06-CV-3409 (JFB), 2006 WL
2620464 at *1, n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (declining to decide on a standard because the stay should
be denied even under the more generous standard).
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The minority of federal courts allow the four preliminary injunction factors to be balanced
against each other, so that success on the other factors may compensate for failure on one.56 In
1997, in Turner, the Second Circuit BAP held that the failure to satisfy any prong will cause the
motion to fail, but in 2009, in General Motors, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York recognized “the Circuit and more recent cases have engaged in a balancing process with
respect to the four factors, as opposed to adopting a rigid rule.”57 Following the General Motor
decision, courts throughout the Second Circuit have increasingly cited its proposition that a
balancing approach should be taken.58 Under the balancing approach, if one prong fails, it must
either be “disregarded or be considered to weigh against granting a stay.”59
B. The Weight Courts Attribute to Each Factor May Differ Regardless of the Approach
Adopted
The Second Circuit recognized that “the degree to which a factor must be present varies
with the strength of the other factors, meaning that more of one [factor] excuses less of the
other.”60 Although all four factors must be satisfied in the majority view, the weight attributed to
each factor may differ.61 For example, courts in the Second Circuit adopting the rigid all-factorssatisfied standard have often weighed the potential substantial injury to non-moving parties, if
the stay is granted, against the potential irreparable injury to the moving party, if the stay is not
granted.62

56

Leonetti & Dalmanieras, supra note 48, at 230.
409 B.R. at 30.
58
See e.g., In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. 674, 681 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Simpson, No. 17-10442,
2018 WL 1940378, at *3 (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 23, 2018).
59
In re Gen. Motors, 409 B.R. at 32.
60
McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,) 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir.2006)).
61
Leonetti & Dalmanieras, supra note 48, at 230.
62
See In re Turner, 207 B.R. 373, 376 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997), as amended (Mar. 4, 1997) (“Because we
have found that the Turners will not suffer irreparable harm if the sale is not stayed, the injury that
Citizens will suffer is greater.”); Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding
57

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

Moreover, regardless of their adoption of either the minority or majority view, courts
have continuously balanced certain factors against each other. For example, the third prong—
probability of success on appeal—may be balanced against the amount of irreparable injury the
plaintiff would suffer if the stay was denied.63 Also, a showing of irreparable injury to nonmoving parties and harm to the public interest are two prongs that may succeed or fail
proportionally to one another because mootness is considered for both.64
Facts are also determinative of which factors carry the most weight in a court’s analysis.
For example, in General Motors, the court primarily considered the stay’s potential detrimental
effect on the public’s interest because it would cause “grievous damage to all of the communities
in which GM operates.”65 Brown provides another example, wherein the Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York focused mainly on the probability of the movant’s success on
appeal.66 The appellant was the debtor’s ex-spouse and she attempted to claim her equitable
distribution of marital assets that the debtor fraudulently concealed.67 The court concluded
because she already accepted the claimed assets in her divorce settlement, her success on appeal
was not plausible.68

harm to the creditor by a continued stall on the foreclosure sale outweighed the harm to the debtor who
was to be foreclosed on).
63
See In re Brown, No. 18-10617 (JLG), 2020 WL 3264057, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020)
(“The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of
irreparable injury that the plaintiff will suffer absent the stay; in other words, ‘more of one excuses less of
the other.’” (quoting In re Sabine Oil, 548 B.R. at 684)).
64
See id. at *7, *10 (finding appellant failed to satisfy the public interest and irreparable injury factors
because there was no evidence her appeal would be mooted without the stay); see also In re Gen. Motors,
409 B.R. at 31, 33 (noting, though other considerations ultimately outweighed these factors, public
interest favors ability to appeal and the rejection of the stay would render the appeal moot, therefore
causing appellant some injury).
65
409 B.R. at 33 (“While I am of course going through a balancing, I must say that [public interest] is a
monumental factor.”).
66
2020 WL 3264057, at *5–10.
67
Id. at *1.
68
Id. at *7–8.
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The court may also condition the relief it grants on filing a bond.69 “The reason for
requiring a bond is to secure the prevailing party against any loss that might be sustained as a
result of an ineffectual appeal.”70 Bonds are particularly helpful in cases where the stay would
cause the diminished value of property.71 In Adelphia, the Southern District Court of New York
granted the stay of an order confirming a highly litigated chapter 11 plan despite the diminishing
value of the estate, upon finding that the “substantial possibility of success on the merits” and the
claims’ impending mootness without the stay, outweighed the “serious financial harm” other
parties may face if the stay was granted.72 The court was heavily influenced by the fact that any
stay granted would be accompanied by a substantial bond near the full amount of potential
financial harm to parties—thus ameliorating any harm caused by the stay.73
Conclusion
As discussed herein, courts in the Second Circuit have largely adopted the preliminary
injunction test rather than the judicial discretion test regardless of the nature of the stay.
Although the courts are split as to how to apply the preliminary injunction test—whether all
factors must be satisfied or not—courts of the Second Circuit adopting either approach may
attribute different weight to each factor in their analysis. For example, a higher showing of
success on appeal allows for a lower showing of a movant’s irreparable injury absent a stay.
Moreover, the potential for mootness of an appeal absent a stay may be considered “irreparable

69

FED. R. BANKR. P. 8007(c).
In re Sphere Holding, 162 B.R. 639, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶
8005.07[2] (1993)).
71
See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also In re Sphere Holding,
162 B.R. at 644 (granting the stay and finding the case doesn’t require a bond because no damage with
result from the stay).
72
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 342, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding also that public
interest did not weigh in favor or against the stay).
73
Id. at 368.
70
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harm” to the movant. Courts may also consider equitable mootness when analyzing the public
interest prong, but they generally favor expedient litigation. Lastly, courts in the Second Circuit
rely on the unique facts of each case to determine the weight attributed to each factor and
whether each factor is satisfied.
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